This was a mid-term paper I wrote in April of 2007. It is an examination of T.H. Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics. I had forgotten about it, and while digging through my old material I happened upon it and was extremely impressed with myself. It’s probably one of my favourite things that I’ve written. This midterm paper entire encapsulates what I’m attempting to draw out in my thesis on Charles Taylor and I think really benefits the ‘Holism’ project I’ve been trying to articulate recently. I intend to go back through several of my old papers throughout my research this term and will let other projects happening here fall to a lower priority while I’m finishing my honours degree. I hope these coming updates will still be entertaining.
If You Can Read This, You Are Already Presupposing Many Complex Conceptual Frameworks.
In the Prolegomena to Ethics T.H. Green, speaking to us from 1883, offers a different way of thinking about what a person is. What Green seems to salvage (and by ‘salvage’, I mean ‘preemptively prescribe’) is an account of the individual that is neither isolated from the exterior world, nor biologically determined to carry out their pre-set performances. For Green, a person is not an empty vessel, and knowledge is not a substance in which it might contain. We have rich and developed set of tools as soon on as we are conscious. Continue reading ‘If You Can Read This, You Are Already Presupposing Many Complex Conceptual Frameworks.’
[this is from a bit of a letter i wrote to a philosophy pal of mine, we’re considering doing a directed reading together for our theses. this letter is a kind of case being made for wittgenstein being so important to me.]
Justin,
Facebook chess has been absolutely amazing by the way, I know I’m shit at it, but it’s still a lot of fun. Otherwise, I hope you’re keeping well.
I’m pretty excited about potentially working on something with/along side you next year. It’s been a bit difficult being away from school, and it’s upsetting that even more of the people I know and enjoy will be gone next year! In regards to Wittgenstein, I have no issues with telling you that it’s probably just a bit of a philosophy crush. For whatever reason, Wittgenstein just sticks with me. Although his outlook is somewhat original, and his methods of presentation, and the overall lore surrounding him is novel and interesting (both in terms of his ‘cult’ following, and otherwise) the ultimate ideas he presents and put forward are not very new at all. I think Wittgenstein is instead important because of the way in which he comes across these ideas, the context in which he is looking at them, and why he remains so difficult to read given the countless veins of thought that call him their originator. To me, he’s a bit like an Abraham, if I can put it so dramatically (and almost comically).
The central idea, and criticism that Wittgenstein has is that the external/internal divide is a misguided one. When speaking, when thinking, in terms of morality or metaphysics, everything we ‘get’ comes from the same ‘place’. This, supplemented with some interesting insight into the sceptical nature of consciousness and a nice articulation of ‘meaning as use’ is why, I think, he’s so interesting.
… Continue reading ‘Why Wittgenstein’
In thinking about the difference between mind and body, internal and external, consciousness and the world and how they further relate to the epistemic foundations of knowledge we’ve been discussing so far in the A Cat Named Schrödinger series. In particular the issues raised in the comments of the most recent Mk II apply to these overall notions of epistemology. By clarifying the problems of knowledge, or at least attempting to clarify them, it will further give us an idea of how to go about systems of social and political ways of living.
I’d like to make the case that there is no real distinction between mind and body, mind and world, or any inside and outside dichotomy. In order to show this, it requires a great deal of work in regard to foundationalism, and epistemology. Epistemology is the study of the base forms of knowledge. It is the area of philosophy that deals with the question “What can we know?” In doing so, we are opened to the foundations of knowledge, and all of those things assumed as the first premises. The issue of course, being that these premises are up for grabs themselves.
In working toward an understanding of epistemological foundations, let’s look at the grand-daddy of them all, Rene Descartes and The Meditations. The central claim in the Second Meditation is “Cogito Ergo Sum”, or “I Think Therefore I Am”. Often touted as a kind of self-help mantra whereby your willing something to be the case makes it the case, this conception is entirely missing the substance of Cartesian epistemology.
… Continue reading ‘A Cat Named Schrödinger Mk III: “Cogito Ergo Sum”’
Warning: Long and Convoluted Reading Ahead
What is freedom really? What does a person mean when they say their freedom is impeded upon? What do we mean when we talk of government (the verb, not the noun)?
This of course relates to the most “Introductory” of “Intro” questions “Are we as human beings in control of our own will, or are we determined by our biologies, god or some other higher control?”. I would say that how you answer this question relates entirely to several issues we’ve touched on so far. Namely, the question of ’something rather than nothing’, and the majority of the ‘A Cat Named Schrodinger‘ series that looks at epistemological foundations.
A podcast I’ve been listening to for some time now is Philosophy Bites, which is a short philosophy podcast that is very well produced and well presented. As an aside, far too often ‘philosophy’ podcasts, blogs, etc. are too whimsical, mild and broad (the present company included!). Bites is a short and concise presentation of an idea or notion or thinker often by someone who has committed a great deal of their own work to the topic at hand. I highly recommend this as it stays true to the tradition and the academic pursuit itself, in the format of a kind of interview or seminar.
On a recent edition of Philosophy Bites was Quentin Skinner and his attempt to define the state by way of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. The reason I bring this particular discussion up is not for any specific contention with Hobbes, or Skinner’s interpretation, but that it is all together a typical and well presented view of ‘the State’ and what we typically think it means ‘to be governed’ thereby making a case for how we typically view the notion of freedom, and freedom of will.
Hobbes is the grandfather of the liberal democracy, and furthermore this idea of Leviathan is the foundation of all social and political philosophy thereafter. Also, for the upcoming Letters to Nana I’ll be discussing the idea of ‘Social Contract‘ and ‘State of Nature‘ at length, and this might help with some clarification. (Although, saying that it is by no means required listening. These are very accessible ideas!)
… Continue reading ‘On Freedom of Will’
Wittgenstein has really made an impact on me, or more specifically, the experiences I’ve had in studying philosophy and the history of ideas has been expressed best by a Wittgensteinian view. I won’t lie to you, he’s kind of a hero of mine (see the title of this freakin’ website). However, the Wittgenstein I have a crush on might not be the Wittgenstein that so many others have had interest in…
The New Wittgenstein is a collection of papers and talks that are linked only in their interpretation of Wittgenstein as being alternative to any contemporary main-stream view. Perhaps I shouldn’t say “alternative”, the editor and author of the introduction describes it as “unorthodox”, and this is the very complex crux of what is “New” about this Wittgenstein.
It seems insanely difficult to explain such a complex problem such as this: that the ‘traditional’ Wittgensteinian view is incorrect, and the criticisms of that view are also incorrect, and the real goal of Wittgenstein’s writings are something different entirely from what has typically been thought.
Let’s back up for a moment and figure out that the hell that even means.
Continue reading ‘thoughts on wittgenstein…’
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