Archive for the 'language' Category

Why Wittgenstein

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[this is from a bit of a letter i wrote to a philosophy pal of mine, we’re considering doing a directed reading together for our theses. this letter is a kind of case being made for wittgenstein being so important to me.]

Justin,
Facebook chess has been absolutely amazing by the way, I know I’m shit at it, but it’s still a lot of fun. Otherwise, I hope you’re keeping well.

I’m pretty excited about potentially working on something with/along side you next year. It’s been a bit difficult being away from school, and it’s upsetting that even more of the people I know and enjoy will be gone next year! In regards to Wittgenstein, I have no issues with telling you that it’s probably just a bit of a philosophy crush. For whatever reason, Wittgenstein just sticks with me. Although his outlook is somewhat original, and his methods of presentation, and the overall lore surrounding him is novel and interesting (both in terms of his ‘cult’ following, and otherwise) the ultimate ideas he presents and put forward are not very new at all. I think Wittgenstein is instead important because of the way in which he comes across these ideas, the context in which he is looking at them, and why he remains so difficult to read given the countless veins of thought that call him their originator. To me, he’s a bit like an Abraham, if I can put it so dramatically (and almost comically).

The central idea, and criticism that Wittgenstein has is that the external/internal divide is a misguided one. When speaking, when thinking, in terms of morality or metaphysics, everything we ‘get’ comes from the same ‘place’. This, supplemented with some interesting insight into the sceptical nature of consciousness and a nice articulation of ‘meaning as use’ is why, I think, he’s so interesting.

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Thoughts on Culture: Wanting a Deaf Baby

I came across this documentary from ‘Best Free Documentaries‘ which I like mostly for their BBC docs on philosophers, but this one has really peaked my interest. Wanting A Deaf Baby is a documentation of a deaf couple’s pregnancy, and their interest in having their child grow up being a non-hearing person.

My favourite line in the whole thing is when they speak to the fellow who is going to be interpreting their wedding, and in discussing the preferred volume of music for them to enjoy the vibrations, he says; “If I know the deaf, they’ll just be talking anyway”.

Not only is it interesting on a dramatic level that this couple is interested in having their baby be what would normally be thought of as ‘impaired’, but what it really makes clear is how a language, and a form of communication constitutes entirely ones life. It questions entirely what a language is, and what it means to have a culture, or a way of life.

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A Cat Named Schrödinger Mk III: “Cogito Ergo Sum”

In thinking about the difference between mind and body, internal and external, consciousness and the world and how they further relate to the epistemic foundations of knowledge we’ve been discussing so far in the A Cat Named Schrödinger series. In particular the issues raised in the comments of the most recent Mk II apply to these overall notions of epistemology. By clarifying the problems of knowledge, or at least attempting to clarify them, it will further give us an idea of how to go about systems of social and political ways of living.

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I’d like to make the case that there is no real distinction between mind and body, mind and world, or any inside and outside dichotomy. In order to show this, it requires a great deal of work in regard to foundationalism, and epistemology. Epistemology is the study of the base forms of knowledge. It is the area of philosophy that deals with the question “What can we know?” In doing so, we are opened to the foundations of knowledge, and all of those things assumed as the first premises. The issue of course, being that these premises are up for grabs themselves.

In working toward an understanding of epistemological foundations, let’s look at the grand-daddy of them all, Rene Descartes and The Meditations. The central claim in the Second Meditation is “Cogito Ergo Sum”, or “I Think Therefore I Am”. Often touted as a kind of self-help mantra whereby your willing something to be the case makes it the case, this conception is entirely missing the substance of Cartesian epistemology.
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On Freedom of Will

Warning: Long and Convoluted Reading Ahead

What is freedom really? What does a person mean when they say their freedom is impeded upon? What do we mean when we talk of government (the verb, not the noun)?

This of course relates to the most “Introductory” of “Intro” questions “Are we as human beings in control of our own will, or are we determined by our biologies, god or some other higher control?”. I would say that how you answer this question relates entirely to several issues we’ve touched on so far. Namely, the question of ’something rather than nothing’, and the majority of the ‘A Cat Named Schrodinger‘ series that looks at epistemological foundations.

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A podcast I’ve been listening to for some time now is Philosophy Bites, which is a short philosophy podcast that is very well produced and well presented. As an aside, far too often ‘philosophy’ podcasts, blogs, etc. are too whimsical, mild and broad (the present company included!). Bites is a short and concise presentation of an idea or notion or thinker often by someone who has committed a great deal of their own work to the topic at hand. I highly recommend this as it stays true to the tradition and the academic pursuit itself, in the format of a kind of interview or seminar.

On a recent edition of Philosophy Bites was Quentin Skinner and his attempt to define the state by way of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. The reason I bring this particular discussion up is not for any specific contention with Hobbes, or Skinner’s interpretation, but that it is all together a typical and well presented view of ‘the State’ and what we typically think it means ‘to be governed’ thereby making a case for how we typically view the notion of freedom, and freedom of will.

Hobbes is the grandfather of the liberal democracy, and furthermore this idea of Leviathan is the foundation of all social and political philosophy thereafter. Also, for the upcoming Letters to Nana I’ll be discussing the idea of ‘Social Contract‘ and ‘State of Nature‘ at length, and this might help with some clarification. (Although, saying that it is by no means required listening. These are very accessible ideas!)

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A Cat Named Schrödinger Mk II

I feel like I should to return to this… I’ve been revisiting Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations In order to clarify some issues that arose in the previous ‘A Cat Named Schrödinger‘ entry.

What does it mean to say that a thing is “Without Meaning”. It cannot be that the thing in question is a vessel which is empty of a kind of substance that we call meaning. As if it is a difference between there being the physical constructional attributes of a thing, and then the quality or function of it.

To talk about meaning as though it has an object and a content is to entirely miss the point about meaning. Is our language so exact and inflexible?

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“Please, Mind your Step. When crossing … be careful of the footing sufficiently. Understood beforehand because the responsibility can not be assumed about the accident in case and so on.”

The meaning gets across, almost entirely to the same degree as it would in ‘proper’ English. It is the case that the linguistic structure fails, but this sentence is meaningful, is it not?

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A Cat Named Schrödinger

I don’t know whether I’ve made a bit of a breakthrough in my own understanding of the issue, or it’s just that I am now again re-grasping the notion, but it’s just seeming much clearer to me this morning than it has been recently.the premise that:

‘a thing (an object in the world) is meaningless and is only invigorated with meaning by my viewing of it’

is entirely off track of how a thing has meaning, and about what meaning is entirely. there is no back and forth on meaninglessness. things that are without meaning are things that are unknowable, and really have no worth (or possibility) of explanation.

are the words on paper dead? no. entirely not. the point is that nothing is dead, if it enters in to your consciousness it is meaningful, it is something.

the recognition of an object suggests already that it has some kind of semantic weight. the spectrum of meaning is the spectrum of reality.

it depends on a kind of horizon of consciousness, not in ‘what you can see’ but in ‘what you can know’.

how does it come about that an arrow points?

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with all this in mind, let us think then about perspective.

the issue at hand might only be problematic in our pre-conceptions of it. for example:

Mathematically, in space and time parallel lines will never meet. However, we assuming here in this mathematical proof that we can have such a thing as a ‘god’s eye view’ or an objective viewpoint. Although it is the case that on paper we can draw itand on the ground we can follow it, but doesn’t it say something that we can truly never see a straight line? Even from space, there is always a concave.

Perhaps the problems what we encounter in quantum physics and in theories of time and space (as they also apply to issues of morality, or social contract) is that we are looking at the world entirely in the wrong way, and assuming that we can look at it through a clean lense.

thoughts on wittgenstein…

The New Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein has really made an impact on me, or more specifically, the experiences I’ve had in studying philosophy and the history of ideas has been expressed best by a Wittgensteinian view. I won’t lie to you, he’s kind of a hero of mine (see the title of this freakin’ website). However, the Wittgenstein I have a crush on might not be the Wittgenstein that so many others have had interest in…

The New Wittgenstein is a collection of papers and talks that are linked only in their interpretation of Wittgenstein as being alternative to any contemporary main-stream view. Perhaps I shouldn’t say “alternative”, the editor and author of the introduction describes it as “unorthodox”, and this is the very complex crux of what is “New” about this Wittgenstein.

It seems insanely difficult to explain such a complex problem such as this: that the ‘traditional’ Wittgensteinian view is incorrect, and the criticisms of that view are also incorrect, and the real goal of Wittgenstein’s writings are something different entirely from what has typically been thought.

Let’s back up for a moment and figure out that the hell that even means.
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