Our Ontological Baggage: Charles Taylor’s Account for Modernity’s False Conception of Self

The character of modernity has led us to have freedom from a set of moral restrictions. Our ’self’ is no longer suppressed and labelled as any one particular thing. I’m not just an insurance salesman, man, I’m also interested in social and political philosophy. There is a considerable amount that we have lost with the shedding of these supposedly oppressive labels, and more distressing is what have we have ‘gained’.

Instead of having the social aspects of ‘insurance salesman’ define us, our convictions lay in an over-arching view of cost-benefit analysis. We are instead led to maximize our ‘label-less’ personhood in ways that fall outside of what our social practices are. Other social ‘objects’, be them persons, places or things are merely instruments and resources in our exploits.

It is difficult to be encouraged to produce a criticism of modernity when it allows us to live in a society in which we are mildly happy, extremely entertained and very well fed. How can our distate of this modern character promote an ideological coup if we are so “well kept”?

The solution begins with Charles Taylor’s attempt to move away from the conception of the universe as a mechanism, and toward a world-view that is based on Ideas. Taylor charges that the modern conception of the self is misguided and it does not capture how persons operate in a social system.

A person, Taylor defines in Human Agency and Language, (p.3) is one who “…not only has some understanding of himself, but is partly constituted by [that] understanding” and who “exist[s] in a space defined by distinctions of worth”. There is no separation between who we are and what we do. Our social interactions and practices, wherever they are performed, are reflections of our moral character. They are always aimed, then, at what we think of as ‘good’.

This conception of a ‘good-centered-self’ is much different than that of the modern-self outlined above. Instead of a freedom from our ‘insurance salesman’-ness, we have a range of distinctive possibilities to act given what ‘insurance’ is, and what ’selling’ means. The individual is so rooted in a community with a specific ‘horizon’ of meaning, our world is constituted by these and other practices. With this notion of the self, Taylor seeks to find solution to the problem of our liberal lethargy.

Among many anticipated contentions of Taylor, I will pursue criticisms that question the neutrality of the good. How can we as ‘good-centered-selves’ account for the ultimate truth of falsity of our goodness? How are we to say that any one social framework is better than the other? If “good” is to be neutral, how do we reconcile other persons with backgrounds that differ with our own, whose intent is to (for example) oppress and/or destroy us?

Another argument of Taylor I intend on exploring is the notion of the ‘good’-centered-ness. Is it the case that we cannot help but be good? Are all actions, however grandiose or minuscule ‘good’ actions? My coin-toss, my nose-wiping, my vote, my Nazi-ism? Furthermore, what does it mean to be moral, and therefore accountable at all times? What does this say about rehabilitation, forgiveness and what it means to “save face”?

As stated, my main concern is to unpack Taylor’s claim that modernity has assumed a false conception of self. Lastly, after exploring Taylor’s notion of the self at length I will take a look at how a ‘Taylorian’ account of personhood would apply to social institutions. What kind of damage has this ‘false conception’ done?

Furthermore, in applying the notion of the ‘good-centered-self’ to these institutions, how might it suggest corrections to their modern disenfranchisement and relieve us of our ontological baggage. My intuition is that there are solutions to these issues and much can be said about a social and political view that is consistent with a correction of the most basic ontological structures that we employ.

If You Can Read This, You Are Already Presupposing Many Complex Conceptual Frameworks.

In the Prolegomena to Ethics T.H. Green, speaking to us from 1883, offers a different way of thinking about what a person is. What Green seems to salvage (and by ‘salvage’, I mean ‘preemptively prescribe’) is an account of the individual that is neither isolated from the exterior world, nor biologically determined to carry out their pre-set performances. For Green, a person is not an empty vessel, and knowledge is not a substance in which it might contain. We have rich and developed set of tools as soon on as we are conscious.

What follows in this paper is a closer examination of Green’s account of person, and how it differs greatly from what we think of in our contemporary sense. It will be interesting to consider the reasons why this notion has been largely left behind. Although I will not discuss this too much here in this paper, I might offer the consideration that it is the fault of the modern distaste in metaphysics, in favour of self-creation and self-truths.

However inadequate his metaphysical setup¹, what is important to take away from Green is the stark contrast to the liberal view of persons that we have today. According to Green, our focus ought to be on how we consider context, cause and intention in the process of developing our moral selves. With some development and buttressing, a proper criticism of those liberal “preferences” might be made. Green had these philosophical problems coming and attempted to show a framework for how this incoming view would ultimately be problematic.

Green holds that we rely heavily on our social institutions and structures for the very base of our understandings of the world. Through this framework we are then made aware of what the self is and how we are cognitive ‘users’ a complex conceptual framework.

The common objects of experience… the particular things we perceive, this flower, this apple, this dog – in the only sense in which they are objects to us or are perceived at all, have their being only for, and result from the action of, a self-distinguishing consciousness.

As perceived, they consist in certain groups of facts, which again consist in possibilities of sensation, known to be related in certain ways to eachother and to some given fact of sensation. (§63)

The fact that we even perceive these things as objects suggests that we have some kind of object-oriented calibration of how we navigate the world. Furthermore, the organization and assumption of further concepts is achieved by a kind of process of inference, using the existing information as arbitrary (in the objective sense) and filling the empty spots in.

Knowledge is a kind of constant regurgitation of our prior experiences. It is an internal knowing that, in the sense that our every day experiences are constantly adding and checking our system of belief. This is a process of compounding networks of concepts that create a framework of what the world is.

The most primitive germ from which knowledge can be developed is already a perception of fact, which implies the action upon successive sensations of a consciousness which holds them in relation, and which therefore cannot itself be before or after them, or exist as a succession at all. (§70)

We do knowledge, a person is a knowledge-er. All of these aspects are entirely context dependant, and are occurring all together, at all times. Everything together, all at once.

We begin to see how this might differ from our modern conception of self when applying this to how we go about living according to our moral standards. The process of our moral beliefs is typically seen as some combination of our desire interests in dialogue with our rational ones.

Sometimes desire and reason have been represented as inviting the man in different directions, while the will has been supposed to decide which of the two directions shall be followed. (§116)

This is the typical form of morality of which we are familiar. The idea that ones heart can be in the ‘right place’, or that our minds can ‘say’ things that are different than other parts of our anatomy.

Green makes a case that these distinctions of sensation, or feeling, and desire are not objects of our consciousness that differ in kind. Instead, these objects require a consciousness to process them as sensations, feeling or desire to begin with. We only make sense of these objects as they are conscious objects that relate to the self, just as we are only able to make sense of our world spatially if we are presupposing an object-oriented world.

There is a difference here between the occurring of an object of consciousness and the act of organizing and articulating those objects. The world only exists as we are acting upon it in this way.

The real agent called Desire is the man or self or subject as desiring; the real agent called intellect is the man as understanding, as perceiving and conceiving; and the man that desires is identical with the man that understands. (§129)

It is problematic to talk about the objects of consciousness as though they are responsible in the decision making process, when we must always consider the subject of which they are the object of. This is the subject that is already rich and complex in its development of a conceptual framework. To assume that an inner dialogue between one’s “quasi-personifications” (§116) is to entirely ignore the process in which how our decisions are made.

Given that objects of consciousness are functions of the same intellectual tools that we use to make our decisions, moral or otherwise,

It lies in the view that in all conduct to which moral predicates are applicable… whether virtuous or vicious, expresses a motive consisting in an idea of personal good.(§115)

We are interested here in how all of these objects of consciousness are functions of the same intellectual tools that we use to make decisions.

We always make decisions based on what we think is best.

A moral life, and the answering of moral consciousness is then something that is not able to achieve with the individual, given the social process that it is.

It is important to note the difference in treating causality as intentional rather than mere occurrence in Green. That our beliefs are come to for specific reasons

We are already working out moral questions, as one reads this, and before, and after, these are always in the process of being checked and re-checked.

This is the ninth mp3 letter ‘written’ to my nana and RSS fed. I ride a bike to school and talk in stuttered phrases due to pedaling or distraction. There is some apologizing for this. After a quick stop at the Family Mart for some lunch we listen to ‘One Great City’ by The Weakerthans off their Reconstruction Site album [Golden Boy photo from Miss Vincci (cc) on Flickr]. The bike ride home is spent rambling.

More important is that this notion ought to be taken as an argument for ideas, their production and sale as a hyper-pragmatical and transparent process. That we are making sure that what we say is important and productive, and that we are doing these things for good and productive reasons.

This is part of the ‘holistic’ notion that ought to be hammered out a bit more before continuing. To begin with, we are attempting to eliminate the idea that we have a split between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ selves, and that these selves interact with one another and the end result is a kind of morality. The idea of living ‘morally’ this way in a kind of contractual obligation, is one that we in the capitalist-liberal tradition rest on how our private person acts in public, that they are different in kind from one another and that we rely on other public selves to keep our public self in moral check, even though our private self might want to murder/maim/destroy other public selves.

The goal of this Holism series is to show the importance of living publicly, at all times in all ways. It is to explore the notions of a world without a private self (not necessarily an absence of private things or matters, but the absence of privacy from other persons in language or thought).

Perhaps it hasn’t been best to begin here, but rest assured that what is being suggested is in line with what has already been established and explored in the rest of the A Cat Named Shrodinger series.

Soon to come will be a discussion directed to privacy itself, to hopefully clarify some issues, but keeping with the theme of intellectual property, for now let’s find the bridge to these two concepts of Privacy and Property.

Applying the idea of a public space of consciousness and a public responsibility in creation we then find that the sale and protection of such items to a the enth degree is not consistent with the operations of our selves in the world. There is no claim to a solution being presented here, really, except to emphasize the importance of the Creative Commons organization and the movement of CopyLeft. The shareability offers so much more in collaboration and creativity than clip-art libraries and closed-off art galleries.

The goal of this is merely to question and to have the artist question their role in their creation and subsequently, their deservedness of any monetary gain derived. Given these parameters set on the importance of a public consciousness, how is it possible to expect payment for something that is technically in the terms of existing property theory not yours and not created by only you.

Treating property as currency is a threat. The threat is to education at large in forming and fostering a social system that is not dependant and obsessed with the prisoner’s dillema of self-interest and suspicion. It is not the case that art can’t be a profession, but just a question of whether, given the outline of what we know makes a person, that art as a profession is a profession at all.

Are we, all of us, so proud of what we do?

This is the Eighth Letter to Nana in which I ramble on my way home from a school in North Iwata, and jump on a train to go home to Hamamatsu. In which, I discuss teaching children, change in season / schoolyear / child-development. Also, some Japanese school system attire, upcoming plans for Golden week and we hear “Do You Like Icecream?” ‘Lime’ Level Unit 11 Song, “Paper Plates” by Butter Vaughn Kingson, along with what it’s like to ride on a train in Japan.

The sound quality may or may not be so great due to my lack of meticulousness in monitoring the peaks. Also, there may oor may not be too much “train-listening” time. I may, or may not be apologizing for these things.

What are we doing when we engage in the activity and publishing of art or ideas? Here I’m using ‘Art’ in an extremely broad sense, far more broad than is typical. I’d qualify anything from fiction, non-fiction, painting, journalism, photography, patents, or proofs; intangible, or seemingly intangible property is what I would call ‘Art’. This exchange of ideas as the step before we apply or manifest them as physical objects. Admittedly, this applies to any set of ideas about the world.

However, for the sake of simplicity, let’s deal with Intellectual property in the space of ‘Art’. This is admittedly up for grabs, and even slightly contentious in terms of what property in general is. I feel as though property, in general, is property. However, that’s not to be argued here. The focus here is on ideas, and intellectual property, whatever that means.

The Social Framework is Defined by the Expression of Ideas

Art, Ideas, whatever it is, Expression in general is how we articulate and navigate the world. Our perception of the world is not a passive activity, we are not merely being changed by the incoming information from the world, we meet this incoming information with a rich and vast range existing commitments. The expressions hit with some resistance, a slight give, rather than being entirely absorbed. We are ever acting on and dealing with the dialogue between those incoming interests with one’s own existing interests. My writing to you now is framing things in such a way to be, or attempt to be, understandable and clear. I have certain commitments about the world, and hope that these commitments are coming across for your own processing.

What we do articulates to world around us, informing and educating even if it is only slightly. Our experiences are rich, and have been informed by expressions in the public framework. The social structure articulates the world around us. The expression of ideas is what this is. Talking, painting, writing, thinking, any thing that we are doing is articulating and building upon the world as perceived. Our influences are vast and complex and our responsibility to present those influences and ideas in such a way that is positive or at least constructive is extremely important.

Therefore, The Importance of Good Art and The Misappropriation of Ideas

Keeping in mind that there has been a great deal of philosophical backing to this notion of Social Framework and the relation to Personhood.

Given this definition of art as an internal dialogue, while also being an important informant to the way the world is structured, it is extremely fragile. Ideas are vulnerable but important to the way of communication and education. What does it say about a social system, or a person who is interested in the protection and attribution of that work for monetary or populous gains?

The protection or attribution of our ideas from further duplication, sale, or otherwise seeks to break that connectivity of social framework, and cloud the intention of legitimate contribution to the humanist project. The current system of property right is not compatible with the operations of our consciousness, and therefore does not seek to further cultivate the expression of our ideas.

If a person is a kind of conglomerate of the existing social structure, constituted by the social objects and obstacles therein, how is it that what I’ve created just now with this brush, or with this guitar is mine?

If we mistake the idea of intellectual property protection as valuable in its exchange-value (monetary) and rely less and less on its value of utility (as a part of the common intellectual creative process we are all engaging in) then we are no longer making an expression of any important content aside from publishing it as a ‘buy-able’ object. Art and Ideas become very closed off from the realm of fragile education or, it further reinforces the importance of monetary gains and competition between valuable things. Art (ideas) ought not to be thought of as a lottery ticket.

The exchange of ideas ought to be taken very seriously, as everything we “put out” is in one form or another, structuring the environment in which we and everyone else must live in. We, each of us, pee in the same pool, if you will. The idea here is that everything we do/make/say/think goes somewhere and does something.

Why are we worried about the sale of our art? Why are we worried about the theft of our art? Are without it if it is copied? Ask instead what we make it for in the first place.

The Cost of Art

We ought to be paying or supporting the method of production rather than the object produced. Not only then is this a case made against the monetization of ‘art’ but it is a case against it really being yours. Forms of property and ownership do not represent how our consciousness, and how our interactions with other consciousnesses and the environment at large go on.

There is nothing necessarily wrong with monetary compensation from the ideas we make and the art we publish, but the system of paying for content, rather than paying for the access or venue to receive or take in that content are two different things entirely.

Personally, I take issue with paying for music in physical or digital form, but I would NEVER think twice about paying to go to a live show of that same artist I would otherwise not have had interest in.

Ideas are made from our activity in the world. To be a full-time artist is to miss the point of being a participant in, and making our criticism of the world.

The Creative Commons, GNU, Copyleft

This is, I think, the philosophical framework for why open source philosophy in software/hardware production is such a benefit. Also for why programs like the Creative Commons, or the GNU notion of “Copyleft”. That we share information openly, and charge or donate for actual labour, maintenance, consultation or otherwise. That we are aware of where and how we receive the content, and provide accordingly for it, but have no commitment to the content itself.

The CC is a platform that plays directly to the expression of ideas as explained above. A platform in which is intrinsically based and supportive of this kind of dialogue. That we might openlly allow access with subsequent links to places and areas in which the discussions about those ideas take place. Again, the current system of property right is not compatible with the operations of our consciousness, and therefore does not seek to further cultivate the expression of our ideas. The Creative Commons, in contrast, not only allows but endorses the share-ability and non-commercialness of an authentic dialogue of ideas.

Open and Public

A Person is not a person without other people. There is no real I, we’re confusing that where we come from is already away from an isolated individualism. The internet culture of myspace and amateurness is admittedly narcissistic, but there is no such thing as meaninglessness. If people say it, they mean it in some facet. The connectivity among human beings is what busts out of this libertarian angle on “Internet Culture”.

If we look hard at people who are passionate about what they are writing or saying or doing, you will indeed find a legitimate kind of compulsion to share and build and figure “it” (whatever “it” is) out. It might be masterbation, but even masterbation has the benefit of being self-practice or self-exploration.

This is the seventh Letter to Nana in the series in which I write from my school in Iwata and walk about 15 minutes to the station to go home for the evening. I discuss my dad visiting, how it’s odd living again with my father, and how much fun and frustrating it is to travel with him.

There is some talk about the awkwardness that seems to surround a foreigner living in Japan. This talk may or may not be interesting or insightful or important. I don’t feel as though it’s offencive, but it may be, although I’m not sure how. What I do know is that, for whatever reason, it’s awkward to talk about. This is really why I am bringing it up, so that I can explore why it is so awkward.

Although this has been discussed to death, and shown in film and television, It’s another thing entirely to experience first hand. I hope I’m making at least some kind of clear case here.

This is the sixth in the series of Letters to Nana highlighting Jeannine and Aaron’s trip to Tokyo in the Winter of 2008. Although there is some amount of preambling in explanation of Tokyo and their trip’s itinerary, there is a slideshow of photos set to music during the last (and better) half of this episode. Tokyo is good, and we recommend going there.

The music used is used without permission, but we’re not really concerned.
+81 - Deerhoof
(Aaron’s Karaoke rendition of Everyday by Buddy Holly)
Tout va pour le mieux dans le pire des mondes - Les Breastfeeders
The Stars of Track and Field - Belle and Sebastian

You can Download Letters to Nana 6 here (Requires Quicktime).

This entire blogging project has been more about archiving the development of my thinking in a semi-academic way, taking seriously thought and reasons and history. I am still very much open to it changing. However, after having some time to read and write and work on these ideas, I only have some flimsy understanding of how to apply them in the “real world” (whatever that means). It has, and will continue to be, a drafting process for something larger. Books, papers, theses, etc. so please bear with me. As the reader, I hope you feel a compulsion to not let me get away with anything. I like to consider this entire experience as a kind of directed reading with Aaron, and I’d like to develop it to be even more interesting in that regard.

In the next few days I’ll start out with a discussion of property in general, and intellectual property in particular. I hope you can find something to take away from it. In the meantime, let’s talk a bit more about Holism. For one, I’m not sure of this term, and before we even begin, I just want you to know that I don’t really understand the historical context that this term has. Any -ism’s that are attached to it might not be at all what I’m trying to get at.

A lot of my time goes in to the study of language theory, philosophy and social/political thought. I spend so much of my energy on these things for finding specific reasons and justifications for how to live better and have better ideas for how to operate on the level of public policy.

To stay holistic, I am committed to certain ideals politically such as universal health care, labour tendencies to support unions, or a personal contribution of vegetarianism. I find that all of these actions are coherent and necessary to stay consistent with the foundational claims I’m making about human beings, aligning and understanding of person-hood with a prescriptive outline of how we ought to be living.

This is admittedly a huge project, but in keeping with the epistemic commitments that I’ve begun (and will continue) to outline (please see the A Cat Named Schrödinger series, and the On Freedom of Will post) my own personal development is not just for my own person, it is from and for the socio-economic system as a whole. However grandiose that sounds, I think that our expressive narratives and interpretations about the world are what constitute it entirely (which I hope to make a case for as this new series develops). We are never really alone in our development and our communities are as much a part of us, as we are of them.